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Abstract
Coherent upper and lower probabilities, Choquet capacities of order 2, belief func-
tions and possibility measures are amongst the most popular mathematical models for
uncertainty and partial ignorance. Examples are given to show that these models are not
suciently general to represent some common types of uncertainty. In particular, they
are not suciently informative about expectations and conditional probabilities. Co-
herent lower previsions and sets of probability measures are considerably more general,
but they may not be suciently informative for some purposes. Two other models for
uncertainty, which involve partial preference orderings and sets of desirable gambles,
are discussed. These are more informative and more general than the previous models,
and they may provide a suitable mathematical foundation for a unified theory of
imprecise probability. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Choquet capacity; Coherence; Comparative probability; Credal sets;
Desirable gambles; Foundations of probability; Interval-valued probability; Lower
prevision; Lower probability; Partial preference ordering; Uncertainty measures
1. Introduction
Can there be a unified theory of imprecise probability? At present there are
numerous mathematical models, interpretations and applications of imprecise
probabilities. The various articles in this volume and in [3,4] give some idea of
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the wide variety of approaches that are currently being developed. As a general
or unified theory may be expected to accommodate this variety of mathe-
matical models, interpretations and applications, it may appear that such a
theory will be dicult to attain.
My view is that a general theory of imprecise probability, as in [30], can
accommodate all the kinds of uncertainty and partial ignorance that are cur-
rently being studied, including vague or qualitative judgements of uncertainty,
models for complete ignorance or near ignorance, random sets and multivalued
mappings, and partial information about an unknown probability measure. To
defend this view it is necessary to examine these types of uncertainty in some
detail, and this has been attempted in my previous work, particularly in
[30,31,34].
My aim in this paper is more limited: to consider what level of mathematical
generality will be needed in a unified theory of imprecise probability. I will
argue that none of the mathematical models that are most popular at present
(numbers 1–4 in the list below) is suciently general, and I will suggest several
other models that do seem to be suciently general but have received less
attention than they deserve. By a ‘suciently general’ model, I mean one that
can represent all the types of uncertainty and partial ignorance that are com-
monly encountered in applications.
The mathematical models that I consider are, in order of increasing gener-
ality:
1. possibility measures and necessity measures [8,43],
2. belief functions and plausibility functions [6,25],
3. Choquet capacities of order 2 [2,7,16],
4. coherent upper and lower probabilities [16,20,26],
5. coherent upper and lower previsions [30–32,40],
6. sets of probability measures [1,15,22],
7. sets of desirable gambles [30,39,42],
8. partial preference orderings [14,30].
Another important type of model, which can be regarded as a special case of
model 8, is
9. partial comparative probability orderings [9,18,19].
I think that all the models I have listed are appropriate and useful in
particular types of application. Some well-known examples are: (1) vague
judgements of uncertainty in natural language; (2) multivalued mappings and
non-specific information; (3) some types of statistical neighbourhood in
robustness studies, and various economic applications; (4) personal betting
rates, and upper and lower bounds for probabilities; (5) buying and selling
prices for gambles, upper and lower bounds for expectations, and envelopes of
expert opinions; (6) partial information about an unknown probability
measure, and robust statistical models; (7,8) preference judgements in decision
making; and (9) qualitative judgements of uncertainty.
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If each of these models is useful in some types of application, of course it
follows that a suciently general model should include all the listed models as
special cases. This argument supports the most general of the models, num-
bers 7 and 8, as the most promising candidates for a unified theory. In the rest
of the paper, I develop this argument by examining the mathematical models
and the relationships between them in more detail, especially with regard to
their mathematical generality. Less attention is given to possibility measures
and belief functions, because they are the least general of the models con-
sidered here and I have already discussed them in some detail in [31]. In this
paper, I consider the other models, numbers 3–8, in order of increasing
generality.
My argument is based largely on examples which show that models 1–6 are
not suciently general. To simplify the argument, I have chosen the examples
to be as simple as possible and to involve only 3 or 4 possible outcomes. The
phenomena illustrated in the examples are not restricted to small spaces but
actually occur more frequently in larger spaces.
Most of the results in this paper have been discussed in my previous work,
especially in [30,31]. My main objective here is to consider the implications of
these results for the choice of a mathematical model, because this is a funda-
mental issue in building a theory of imprecise probability, and because many
people continue to advocate models which have limited applicability. In view
of the multiplicity of mathematical models that have been proposed, it is
surprising that, apart from [30, Section 3.8.6; 31], there has been little discus-
sion about their expressiveness and generality.
2. Choquet capacities of order 2
Let X denote the set of possible outcomes under consideration. Suppose that
lower probabilities P A are defined for all A 2K, where K is a collection of
subsets of X. In this section, K is assumed to be an algebra. For models 1–4 in
the earlier list, lower probabilities determine conjugate upper probabilities
through P A  1ÿ PAc, so it suces to consider lower probabilities. 1
Assume that 06 PA6 1 for all A 2K, P ;  0 and PX  1. The lower
probability P is said to be 2-monotone, or a Choquet capacity of order 2 or a
convex capacity, when it also satisfies, whenever A and B are in K,
P A [ B  P A \ BP P A  PB: 1
1 Upper and lower probabilities are also known as interval-valued or interval or non-additive
probabilities.
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It is well known that probability measures, belief functions and necessity
measures (the conjugates of possibility measures) are 2-monotone lower
probabilities. A simple method of constructing 2-monotone lower probabilities
is to apply a convex transformation to the probability interval: if P0 is a
probability measure on K, f is a convex function from 0; 1 into 0; 1 with
f 0  0, and P is defined by P X  1 and P A  f P0A when A 2K and
A 6 X, then P is a 2-monotone lower probability. Many of the neighbourhood
models used in Bayesian and frequentist studies of robust statistics are of this
form [33].
To show that order-2 capacities are not suciently general, I shall give a
simple example of coherent lower probabilities that are not 2-monotone.
Example 1 (Coin tossing [28; 30, Section 5.13.4]). Suppose that a fair coin is
‘tossed’ twice, in such a way that heads and tails are equally likely on each of
the tosses but there is unknown interaction or dependence between the out-
comes. For example, the coin may be tossed first in the usual way, but on the
second ‘toss’ it may be placed to have the same outcome as the first toss, or it
may be placed to have the opposite outcome from the first toss.
Let H1 and T1 denote the possible outcomes (heads or tails) of the first toss,
and similarly H2 and T2 for the second toss. To simplify the notation, denote
the possible joint outcomes H1H2;H1T2; T1H2; T1T2 by a; b; c; d. If we are
completely ignorant about the interaction between the two tosses, we can
model our uncertainty about the outcomes by using the set of all probability
measures P that assign P H1  PH2  12. Let M denote this set of probability
measures. The two extreme points of M are the probability measures that
assign probabilities 0; 1
2
; 1
2
; 0 and 1
2
; 0; 0; 1
2
 to a; b; c; d. These two extreme
points correspond to the two possible mechanisms, mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, by which the first outcome may determine the second.
We find the upper and lower probabilities that are generated by M by
maximizing and minimizing probabilities under the two extreme points.
Since H1 \ H2  fag and H1 [ H2  fa; b; cg, we obtain P H1  PH1 
1
2
 P H2  P H2, P H1 \ H2  0, P H1 \ H2  12, P H1 [ H2  12, and
P H1 [ H2  1. These upper and lower probabilities are coherent, because
they are upper and lower envelopes of a set of probability measures. But the
lower probabilities are not 2-monotone, since
P H1 [ H2  PH1 \ H2  1
2
< 1  P H1  P H2:
This example also illustrates that the Choquet integral [2,7] is a bad way of
defining lower expectations when lower probabilities are not 2-monotone. Let
X denote the number of heads obtained in the two tosses, and let IA denote the
indicator function of an event A. Since both tosses are fair, we should obtain
the precise expectation
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EX   EIH1  IH2  EIH1  EIH2
 P H1  P H2  1
2
 1
2
 1:
But it can be verified that the Choquet integral produces upper and lower
expectations EX   3
2
and EX   1
2
, values that are inconsistent with the
probabilities P H1  P H2  12. Generally the Choquet integral produces co-
herent upper and lower expectations if and only if the initial lower probability
function is 2-monotone [28].
The preceding example also shows that belief functions and possibility
measures are not suciently general, since these models are special types of
order-2 capacities. Belief functions [25] are lower probability measures that are
n-monotone for all positive integers n. This is a much stronger requirement than
2-monotonicity. Necessity measures, the conjugates of possibility measures [8],
are a very special type of belief function.
In my experience, most of the coherent lower probability models that occur
in applications are not 2-monotone. In turn, most of the 2-monotone lower
probabilities in applications are not belief functions; examples are the lower
probabilities in Example 2 below and many neighbourhood models used in
robustness studies, such as the pari-mutuel betting model [30, Section 2.9.3]
and the Bayes basis and total variation models [33], which are 2-monotone but
not 3-monotone in general. Finally, most belief functions are not necessity
measures; examples are probability measures, epsilon-contamination models,
and the lower probabilities in Example 3 below.
This is not to deny that there are important applications in which belief
functions or possibility measures are good models, and indeed some of these
applications are especially important because they are clear instances where
probability measures are inadequate models and imprecise probabilities are
needed; see [25,34,44] for examples. My point is simply that order-2 capacities,
which include belief functions and possibility measures, are not suciently
general to model some common types of uncertainty. A more extensive dis-
cussion of the advantages and limitations of belief functions and possibility
measures, with further examples, can be found in [31].
3. Coherent lower probabilities
The simplest mathematical characterization of coherent lower probabilities
is that they are lower envelopes of a set of probability measures. That is, lower
probabilities P , defined on K, are coherent if and only if there is a nonempty
set of probability measures, M, such that P A  minfP A : P 2Mg for all
A 2K. Another characterization in terms of positive linear combinations of
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desirable gambles, which shows that coherence is a normative requirement of
consistency, is given in [30–32].
All 2-monotone lower probabilities are coherent [16,28]. Example 1 there-
fore shows that coherence is more general than 2-monotonicity. But coherent
lower probabilities are still not suciently general, for the following reasons:
(a) They cannot model comparative probability judgements such as ‘‘event A
is at least as probable as B’’ or ‘‘A is at least c times as probable as B’’.
(b) They do not determine unique lower (or upper) expectations, which are
needed for making decisions.
(c) They do not determine unique conditional lower (or upper) probabilities,
which are needed for making inferences.
(d) Even in problems where lower probabilities are an adequate model for an
initial state of uncertainty, after we condition on a subset of X, the updated
lower probabilities may no longer be adequate because they have lost rel-
evant information [17].
Problems (a), (b) and (c) can be illustrated by a single example involving
comparative probability judgements; other examples are in [21; 30, Section
2.7.3, Chapter 4].
Example 2 (A football game [30,31]). Consider a football game with three
possible outcomes for the home team, labelled as W (win), D (draw) and L
(loss). Suppose that a subject makes three qualitative judgements of his un-
certainty concerning the outcome: (i) ‘not win’ is at least as probable as win;
(ii) win is at least as probable as draw; and (iii) draw is at least as probable as loss.
Judgement (i) can be represented in terms of upper or lower probabilities by
P W 6 1
2
or PD [ LP 1
2
. The other two judgements cannot be represented
adequately in terms of upper or lower probabilities: for example, the transla-
tion PW P P D of judgement (ii) is too strong. Instead, the three judgements
should be regarded as constraints on a coherent lower prevision, as in Section
4(a), or, equivalently, as constraints on a probability measure P, of the form:
(i) P W 6 1
2
; (ii) P W P P D; and (iii) P DP P L.
Let M denote the set of all probability measures that satisfy these three
constraints. Then M is a closed convex polyhedron (a triangle in this case)
whose three extreme points assign probabilities 1
2
; 1
2
; 0; 1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
 and 1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
 to
the outcomes W ;D; L. The set M generates upper probabilities 1
2
; 1
2
; 1
3
and
lower probabilities 1
3
; 1
4
; 0 for W ;D; L, respectively, by maximizing and mini-
mizing probabilities under the extreme points.
Now suppose that the subject is permitted to express his uncertainty only by
making judgements of upper and lower probabilities, and he assesses the upper
and lower probabilities that were just specified. The model produced by these
judgements, M, is the set of all probability measures P that lie between the
upper and lower probabilities, i.e., that satisfy P A6 PA6 PA for
A  W ;D; L. We find that M is a closed convex polyhedron with five extreme
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points: in addition to the three extreme points ofM,M has the extreme points
1
3
; 1
2
; 1
6
 and  5
12
; 1
4
; 1
3
. Because M is strictly contained in M, the new model M is
less informative than the previous model M. In other words, the upper and
lower probabilities are less informative than the qualitative judgements (i)–(iii)
which generated them. Information may be lost when uncertainty is modelled
only in terms of upper and lower probabilities.
To see that the lost information is relevant in calculating lower expectations,
consider the random variable X  IW ÿ ID, which takes the value 1 if W occurs,
ÿ1 if D, and 0 otherwise. By minimizing expectations with respect to the ex-
treme points, we find that the lower expectation is EX   0 under the first
model (M), but EX   ÿ1
6
under the second model (M).
To see that the lost information is relevant in calculating conditional lower
probabilities, consider conditioning on the observation (B) that the outcome is
not L. By conditioning the extreme points and minimizing, we find that
P W jB  1
2
under M but P W jB  2
5
under M.
The sets M and M generate the same unconditional upper and lower
probabilities. Given only these upper and lower probabilities, we cannot tell
whether the underlying model for uncertainty is M or M or some other set.
Consequently we cannot tell whether the upper and lower expectations and
conditional probabilities should be those generated by M or by M or by some
other model.
The lower probability measure in this example is not a belief function (see
Example 3 of [31]), but it is 2-monotone, simply because the possibility space is
so small: all coherent lower probabilities on a 3-point space are 2-monotone.
Suppose that we extend the space to four possible outcomes by distinguishing
scoring draws from non-scoring draws, and we add one more judgement to the
earlier ones: the event that there is a scoring draw or a loss is at least as
probable as a win. Then the resulting lower probabilities are not 2-monotone.
When lower probabilities are generated by the kinds of qualitative judgements
in this example, 2-monotonicity becomes less likely as the possibility space gets
larger.
Example 3 (Coin tossing). To illustrate problem (d), consider the set of prob-
ability measures, M, defined in Example 1, which models two coin tosses with
unknown interaction. It can be verified that M is the set of all probability
measures that lie between the upper and lower probabilities stated in Example
1, and in fact M is the unique closed convex set of probability measures that
generates these upper and lower probabilities as its upper and lower envelopes.
In this case the upper and lower probabilities are adequate models for uncer-
tainty, because they uniquely determine M.
Now suppose that we learn partial information about the outcomes of the
two tosses: we learn that at least one outcome was heads. How does that
change our uncertainty? We should update M to M0 by conditioning the two
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extreme points of M on fa; b; cg, using Bayes’ rule [30, Section 6.4]. Hence the
two extreme points of M0 assign probabilities 0; 1
2
; 1
2
 and 1; 0; 0 to a; b; c.
The updated set M0 generates upper probabilities P fag  1 and Pfbg
 P fcg  1
2
, and lower probability 0 for each possible outcome. 2 But now
these upper and lower probabilities are not an adequate model for the updated
uncertainty, because they are not suciently informative to determine M0. The
set of all probability measures that lie between the upper and lower proba-
bilities, M00, has four extreme points: 0; 1
2
; 1
2
; 1; 0; 0, 1
2
; 1
2
; 0, and 1
2
; 0; 1
2
. If we
replace M0 by the upper and lower probabilities or by M00, we lose information
that might be needed in making decisions. For example, the upper and lower
expectations of X  Ifbg ÿ Ifcg are EX   EX   0 under M0, so that X is
equivalent to the zero gamble. But under M00, EX   1
2
and EX   ÿ1
2
, so that
the value of X is highly indeterminate.
In view of these inadequacies of upper and lower probabilities, why have
they received so much attention in the literature on imprecise probability? I
think that this is due largely to an uncritical acceptance of the traditional
approach of probability theory. A precise probability measure P does deter-
mine unique expectations by integration, through the formula
EP X  
R
X X xP dx, or EP X  
P
x2X X xP fxg if X is finite, and EP is
the unique linear expectation functional whose restriction to events is P. Thus
there is a one-to-one correspondence between probability measures and linear
expectation functionals, and no information is lost when uncertainty is speci-
fied in terms of a probability measure. Also a probability measure P determines
unique conditional probabilities through the formula P AjB  P A \ B=PB
(Bayes’ rule), provided that P B > 0.
This explains why probability theory can be formulated in terms of un-
conditional probabilities. Nevertheless, there are some advantages in formu-
lating probability theory in terms of expectations or previsions, as in [12,38].
Also, as de Finetti recognized, the usual formulation is inadequate for dealing
with conditioning events that have probability zero. The case P B  0 is
discussed in later sections.
It is clear from (b) and (c) above that these properties of probability mea-
sures do not generalize to lower probabilities. Many lower expectation func-
tionals and many conditional lower probability measures can have the same
restriction to an unconditional lower probability measure. In other words,
lower probabilities are not suciently informative to determine unique lower
expectations and unique conditional lower probabilities. In my experience,
lower and upper probabilities are inadequate models in many applications,
including most applications in which imprecise probability models are
2 The resulting lower probability measure is a belief function but not a necessity measure.
132 P. Walley / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 24 (2000) 125–148
constructed from sets of probability measures, as in Example 1, or from
qualitative judgements of uncertainty, as in Example 2.
Upper and lower probability models which are not necessarily coherent
[10,27], including Choquet capacities of order 1, which are also called simply
capacities or fuzzy measures [36], are mathematically more general than co-
herent upper and lower probabilities but they are inadequate for the same
reasons. As set functions, they are not suciently informative about upper and
lower expectations and conditional probabilities.
4. Coherent lower previsions
A bounded mapping from X to R (the real numbers) is called a gamble. Let
K be a nonempty set of gambles. A mapping P : K! R is called a lower
prevision or lower expectation. A lower prevision is said to be coherent when it
is the lower envelope of some set of linear expectations, i.e., when there is a
nonempty set of probability measures, M, such that P X   minfEP X 
: P 2Mg for all X 2K, where EP X  denotes the expectation of X with respect
to P. The conjugate upper prevision is determined by P X   ÿP ÿX  
maxfEP X  : P 2Mg.
Example 4 (Coin tossing). The set of probability measures M in Example 1
generates a coherent lower prevision P through P X   minfEP X  : P 2Mg.
Using the fact that the minimum is achieved by one of the two extreme points
specified in Example 1, we find that
P X   1
2
minfX b  X c;X a  X dg 2
for every gamble X. The upper prevision PX  is obtained by replacing min by
max in this formula.
When K is a linear space of gambles, coherence is equivalent to the three
simple axioms, for all X ; Y 2K:
A1. P X P inffX x : x 2 Xg,
A2. P cX   cP X  whenever c 2 R,
A3. P X  Y P P X   PY .
Coherent lower probabilities can be regarded as a special type of coherent
lower prevision, by taking K to be a set of indicator functions of subsets of X
and identifying the lower probability of a subset with the lower prevision of its
indicator function. For that reason, it is convenient to adopt de Finetti’s
convention of using the same symbol to denote both a subset of X and its
indicator function.
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Coherent lower previsions avoid most of the defects of lower probabilities
that were discussed in Section 3:
(a) Lower previsions can model the comparative probability judgement ‘‘A is at
least as probable as B’’ by P Aÿ BP 0, and ‘‘A is at least c times as prob-
able as B’’ by P Aÿ cBP 0. (Here A and B denote both events and their
indicator functions.) In Example 2, for instance, the three judgements
would be modelled through the constraints P D Lÿ W P 0,
P W ÿ DP 0 and P Dÿ LP 0.
(b) Lower expectations (i.e., lower previsions) are uniquely determined for all
gambles in K.
(c) Unconditional lower previsions uniquely determine conditional lower pre-
visions P X jB, through the generalized Bayes rule
P BX ÿ PX jB  0; 3
provided that P B > 0 and the left-hand side of (3) is defined, i.e., the gamble
BX ÿ P X jB is in K. This equation, like Bayes’ rule, is necessary for co-
herence of conditional and unconditional previsions [30, Section 6.4]. The
equation has a unique solution P X jB because P BX ÿ c is strictly de-
creasing in c if P B > 0. Conditional lower probabilities P AjB are deter-
mined by taking X in (3) to be the indicator function of A.
Example 5 (Coin tossing). In Example 1, suppose we want to condition on the
event B  fa; b; cg, that at least one outcome was heads. Using formula (2) for
lower previsions, we can solve (3) to obtain the conditional lower previsions
P X jB  minfX a; 1
2
X b  1
2
X cg (for all gambles X). This is the lower en-
velope of the updated set of probability measures, M0, in Example 3. More
generally, conditioning lower previsions by the generalized Bayes rule (3) al-
ways agrees with conditioning the extreme points of the corresponding set M
by Bayes’ rule.
(d) Because there is a one-to-one correspondence between coherent lower pre-
visions and closed convex sets of probability measures, coherent lower pre-
visions also solve the problem of missing information that was illustrated in
Example 3.
So coherent lower previsions are more general and more informative than
coherent lower probabilities. However, there remain two respects in which
coherent lower previsions may not be suciently informative:
(e) When P B  0, coherent lower previsions do not determine conditional
lower previsions P jB [30, Section 6.10]. This is important when we need
to update lower previsions after observing an event B.
Example 6 (Coin tossing). In Example 1, suppose we learn the information,
denoted by S, that the tosses produced the same outcome: either both heads
(H) or both tails (T). What are the updated lower probabilities P H jS and
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P T jS? Because PS  0, the generalized Bayes rule (3) does not have a un-
ique solution. It implies only that P H jS6 1
2
and P T jS6 1
2
. The vacuous
conditional probabilities P H jS  P T jS  0 are coherent with the initial
model, but so are the precise conditional probabilities P H jS  PT jS  1
2
,
and so are any conditional lower probabilities that lie between these two ex-
tremes. 3
(f) Lower previsions cannot distinguish preference from weak preference. For
example, if X and Y are two gambles such that P X ÿ Y   0, then X is
weakly preferred to Y (X  Y ), but we do not know whether X is preferred
to Y (X  Y ), and it is even possible that Y is preferred to X. This may be
important in decision problems, where X and Y represent the utility func-
tions that are associated with two feasible actions and we must decide which
action to select.
Problems (e) and (f) are both caused by the inadequacy of the real-number
scale. The same problems occur for precise probabilities, which of course are a
special case of lower probability or lower prevision. Conditioning on events of
probability zero causes real diculties in Kolmogorov’s theory of probability
(Borel’s paradox is a well-known example): if P B  0 then the conditional
probability measure PjB is completely indeterminate. Also, if two gambles X
and Y have the same expectation EX   EY  then preferences between them
are indeterminate: we may have X  Y , Y  X , or X  Y (we are indifferent
between X and Y). It may seem that we should always be indierent between X
and Y when EX   EY , but if X P Y and X x > Y x for some possible
outcomes x then we would surely prefer X to Y. De Finetti [11, Section 5.13]
considered using infinitesimals (nonstandard real numbers) to provide a richer
scale for probability, and one way of doing so is worked out in detail in [41].
It is arguable that problems (e) and (f) are unimportant, because they
concern infinitesimal dierences in unconditional expected utility. In the
Kolmogorov approach, it is often claimed that events of probability zero are
negligible. That may be true before the conditioning event is observed, but after
observing an event of probability zero, dierences that were previously negli-
gible become important. In statistical problems with a continuous sample
space, it is usual that all possible observations have (upper) probability zero,
and then posterior probabilities based on the observation are indeterminate.
Also, it is more common for an event to have lower probability zero than to
have precise probability zero: on an epistemic interpretation, P B  0 means
only that there is no evidence at the present time to support the occurrence of
3 A modified conditioning rule which produces the precise conditional probabilities as the unique
solution was studied in [30, Appendix J]. This rule is equivalent to removing the extreme point
0; 1
2
; 1
2
; 0 from the set of probability measures M in Example 1.
P. Walley / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 24 (2000) 125–148 135
B, not that it has no chance of occurring. In Example 6, for instance, we have
P S  0 but P S  1, so the occurrence of S would not be at all surprising.
Problem (e) could be solved by taking conditional lower prevision to be the
fundamental concept, and specifying P jB directly, when necessary, rather
than attempting to define it in terms of unconditional lower previsions. That
approach was followed in [12] for prevision and in [30] for lower prevision. But
it does not solve problem (f).
5. Sets of probability measures
Can these problems be solved by using a set of probability measures, also
called a credal set [22], as the mathematical model for uncertainty? It is im-
mediately clear that the answer is no. In the special case of precise probability,
the set of probability measures reduces to a single measure and the inade-
quacies of the real-number scale remain. More generally, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between coherent lower previsions (defined on the set of all
gambles) and nonempty closed convex sets of probability measures: the closed
convex set is the set of all probability measures whose expectations dominate
the lower prevision, and the lower prevision is the lower envelope of this set of
expectations [30, Theorem 3.6.1]. If we restrict attention to sets of probability
measures M that are closed and convex, they are exactly as general as coherent
lower previsions. The two models are dual ways of representing the same in-
formation. 4
Greater generality might be achieved by dropping the requirement of con-
vexity, but convexity of M does not appear to have any behavioural or
practical significance, at least when the behaviour is generated by M alone. 5
Any set M has exactly the same behavioural implications as its convex hull:
both sets generate the same lower previsions and preference orderings. In
Example 1, for instance, it makes no dierence to preferences whether we are
completely ignorant about the interaction between the two tosses, which pro-
duces the convex set M in Example 1 as the model for uncertainty, or we know
that the second outcome is completely determined by the first through one of
the two possible deterministic mechanisms, which produces the 2-point set
containing the two extreme points of M.
4 Examples of closed convex sets of probability measures have been given in Examples 1–3.
5 This can change when we combine several sets of probability measures, e.g., if we construct a
model for the joint experiment that consists of two independent repetitions of an experiment
modelled by M, then replacing M by its convex hull may produce dierent behaviour; see
[5, Example 7].
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A little more generality can be achieved by dropping the closure require-
ment. For example, if the three qualitative judgements in the football example
are modified by replacing ‘at least as probable as’ by ‘more probable than’, the
judgements determine an open set which is the interior of the set M in Example
2. The open set models a preference for W over D, since all the probability
measures in it satisfy P W  > PD, whereas the closed set M contains prob-
ability measures with PW   P D and models only a weak preference for W
over D. Distinguishing between open and closed sets of probability measures
can therefore solve problem (f) in some cases.
Similarly, problem (e) can be avoided in some examples by using an open set
of probability measures which does not assign probability zero to any condi-
tioning event B but may have lower envelope P B  0. Then conditional
probabilities and lower probabilities are uniquely determined through Bayes’
rule. In the coin-tossing Example 6, if we modify the set M by removing the
extreme point 0; 1
2
; 1
2
; 0, then all probability measures in the modified set assign
positive probability to S, and we obtain the unique conditional probabilities
P H jS  P T jS  1
2
.
Sets of probability measures can be a little more informative than coherent
lower previsions, but they are still not suciently informative to avoid prob-
lems (e) and (f) in general. Problem (e) remains whenever P B  0, as in
statistical problems with a continuous sample space, since then every proba-
bility measure in the set must assign P B  0 and conditional probabilities are
completely indeterminate. Problem (f) remains whenever two gambles have the
same expected value.
6. Sets of desirable gambles and partial preference orderings
Let L denote the set of all gambles (bounded mappings from X to R). For
X ; Y 2L, write X P Y to mean that X xP Y x for all x 2 X, and write
X > Y to mean that X P Y and X x > Y x for some x 2 X. A set of de-
sirable gambles, denoted by D, is a subset of L. A set of desirable gambles is
said to be coherent when it satisfies the following four axioms:
D1. 0 62 D,
D2. if X 2L and X > 0 then X 2 D,
D3. if X 2 D and c 2 R then cX 2 D,
D4. if X 2 D and Y 2 D then X  Y 2 D.
Thus a coherent set of desirable gambles is a convex cone of gambles that
contains all positive gambles (X > 0) but not the zero gamble.
An additional conglomerability axiom, which implies stronger properties of
coherence, was required in [30]:
D5. if X 2L; X 6 0; B is a partition of X, and BX 2 D [ f0g for all B 2 B,
then X 2 D.
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Axiom D5 is important in a theory of inference which allows conditioning on
continuous variables (the case in which the partition B is infinite). However,
D5 is not needed when X is a finite set, because then it is a consequence of D4,
and it will not be used here.
A partial preference ordering () is a partial ordering of the gambles in L.
‘X  Y ’ is read as ‘gamble X is preferred to gamble Y’. A partial preference
ordering  is said to be coherent when it satisfies the following five axioms, for
all gambles X ; Y ; Z:
P1. not X  X ,
P2. if X > Y then X  Y ,
P3. if X  Y and c 2 R then cX  cY ,
P4. if X  Y and Y  Z then X  Z,
P5. X  Y if and only if X ÿ Y  0.
Axioms P1–P4 are closely related to D1–D4. In fact, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between coherent sets of desirable gambles and coherent
partial preference orderings,6 defined by
X  Y if and only if X ÿ Y 2 D: 4
With this correspondence, the two models are equally general. As mathemat-
ical objects, coherent sets of desirable gambles are simpler than coherent
partial preference orderings because they eliminate some of the redundancy in
the ordering. Here I concentrate on sets of desirable gambles, but all of the
following discussion applies to partial preference orderings through the one-to-
one correspondence.
A set of desirable gambles can retain all the information in the earlier
models, and it can supply some additional information by specifying which
of the gambles on the boundary of the set are desirable. This additional
information is exactly what is needed to condition on events of probability
zero and to distinguish preference from weak preference [30, Section 3.8.6,
Appendix F].
To see that all the information in the earlier models can be represented in
terms of a set of desirable gambles, suppose that a coherent lower prevision P ,
defined on a set of gambles K, is given. If K is the set of all gambles, we can
simply define
D  fX 2L : X > 0 or P X  > 0g: 5
6 See [30, p. 153] for justification. There is also a conglomerability axiom for preferences which
corresponds to D5.
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More generally, define
D 

X 2L : X >
Xn
i1
ciXi ÿ P Xi  e for some n P 0; ci > 0;
e > 0; Xi 2K

: 6
Then D is a coherent set of desirable gambles, and P can be recovered from D
by, for all X 2K,
P X   sup fc : X ÿ c 2 Dg: 7
Coherent lower probabilities are a special case of coherent lower previsions and
so they can be recovered from D by P A  supfc : Aÿ c 2 Dg.
Similarly, given a closed convex set of probability measures, M, define
D  fX 2L : X > 0; or EP X  > 0 for all P 2Mg: 8
Then D is coherent and M can be recovered from it by
M  fP : EP X P 0 for all X 2 Dg: 9
The next example shows that coherent sets of desirable gambles, D, can
contain more information than coherent lower previsions, P , or closed convex
sets of probability measures, M, because several dierent sets D can generate
the same P through (7) and the same M through (9).
Example 7 (Coin tossing). The set of probability measures, M, in Example 1
generates a coherent set of desirable gambles D1 through (8). Using the fact
that EP X  > 0 for all P 2M if and only if EP X  > 0 for both extreme points
of M, which are the probability distributions 0; 1
2
; 1
2
; 0 and 1
2
; 0; 0; 1
2
, we find
that
D1  fX 2L : X > 0; or X b  X c > 0 and X a  X d > 0g:
This is the set of all gambles that must be judged desirable, given M.
Gambles on the boundary of D1, those which satisfy X b  X cP 0 and
X a  X dP 0 with at least one equality, are not included in D1 because they
may or may not be desirable. By classifying the desirability of these gambles we
can obtain a larger and more informative set D. For example, consider the
coherent set
D2  fX 2L : X > 0; or X b  X cP 0 and X a  X d > 0g;
which strictly contains D1. Both D1 and D2 generate the same set M, through
(9), and the same lower previsions, through (7), but we shall see that they
produce dierent conditional lower probabilities and dierent preferences.
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The modelD can be suciently informative to overcome problems (e) and (f):
(e) Conditional lower previsions are uniquely determined by D through the
formula
P X jB  sup fc : BX ÿ c 2 Dg: 10
Hence, conditional lower probabilities P AjB are determined by taking X to
be the indicator function of A. There is no special diculty when P B  0,
nor even when P B  0, because D can provide sucient information to
discriminate between sets of probability zero [30, Appendix F]. An example
is given below (Example 8).
(f) There is a preference for X over Y if and only if X ÿ Y 2 D. There is a weak
preference for X over Y if and only if X ÿ Y  e 2 D for all e > 0. Thus, the
model can distinguish between preference and weak preference. In Example
7, let X  2fag and Y  fdg. Since the gamble X ÿ Y  2; 0; 0;ÿ1 is in D2
but not in D1, X is preferred to Y under model 2, but X is only weakly
preferred to Y under model 1. So D2 is more informative than D1 about
preferences.
Similarly, a comparative probability judgement ‘‘A is more probable than
B’’ can be modelled by requiring that Aÿ B 2 D, and ‘‘A is at least as probable
as B’’ by requiring Aÿ B e 2 D for all e > 0. Sets of desirable gambles are
therefore more general than partial comparative probability orderings, which
are a special type of partial preference ordering in which preferences are
specified only between indicator functions of events. Partial comparative
probability orderings are not suciently general because usually they do not
determine lower probabilities, lower previsions and preferences between other
gambles.
Coherent sets of desirable gambles, and (equivalently) coherent partial
preference orderings, appear to be suciently general and suciently infor-
mative to model the common types of uncertainty and the most important
aspects of uncertainty. Of course coherence is a normative (consistency) re-
quirement and it is unlikely to be an accurate description of people’s intuitive
reasoning. Sets of desirable gambles or partial preference orderings which
satisfy weaker properties than coherence, such as ‘avoiding sure loss’ or
‘n-coherence’ [30], may be more useful as descriptive models.
Although sets of desirable gambles are more general than the previous
models, they simplify the mathematical theory of coherence and natural ex-
tension in [30]. For example, the generalized Bayes rule (3) can be expressed in
the following simple form: if we observe a subset B of X, we should update the
initial set of desirable gambles, D, to D0  fX 2L : BX 2 Dg [30, Section
6.1.6]. More generally, if we obtain a statistical observation that generates a
bounded likelihood function L on X, we should update D to D0 
fX 2L : LX 2 Dg. More generally still, if we observe upper and lower like-
lihood functions U and L [30, Section 8.5.3], then we should update D to
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D0  fX 2L : LX  UXÿ 2 Dg, where X and Xÿ denote the positive and
negative parts of X. These simple rules apply even when conditioning on events
of upper or lower probability zero.
Example 8 (Coin tossing). Consider the coin tossing example, and suppose we
learn that S  fa; dg has occurred, as in Example 6. The event S has lower
probability zero. Two sets of desirable gambles, D1 and D2, were defined in
Example 7. After observing S, these are updated to
D01  fX 2L : SX 2 D1g  fX 2L : X a;X d > 0; 0g;
D02  fX 2L : SX 2 D2g  fX 2L : X a  X d > 0g:
Using (10) or (7), D1 generates the vacuous conditional probabilities and D2
generates the precise conditional probabilities given in Example 6. The extra
information in D2 determines conditional probabilities precisely, and it is ex-
actly what is needed to condition on the event of lower probability zero.
A central idea of the theory in [30] is the idea of natural extension. Suppose
we judge all the gambles in a set D0 to be desirable, where D0 is a subset of
some coherent set but is not necessarily coherent. Then the natural extension of
D0, denoted by D, is defined to be the smallest coherent set of desirable
gambles that contains D0. So D is the smallest convex cone that contains D0
and all positive gambles, and it can be generated from D0 by applying the rules
D2–D4 [42]. The coherent set D fully expresses the implications of the desir-
ability judgements in D0.
An important special case is that in which both X and D0 are finite sets. In
that case the model D is said to be finitely generated [30, Section 4.2]. Finitely
generated models occur frequently in practice, when the modelling or elicita-
tion process produces a finite set of basic judgements which can be translated
into judgements that particular gambles are desirable. A finitely generated set
D produces, through (9), a closed convex set of probability measures, M, that
has finitely many extreme points.
Example 9 (Football). Suppose that we take the judgements in Example 2 to be
the strict comparative probability judgements D [ L  W  D  L, which is
equivalent to taking D0  fD Lÿ W ; W ÿ D; Dÿ Lg. The natural exten-
sion of these judgements is the coherent set of desirable gambles
D  fX 2L : X P c1D Lÿ W   c2W ÿ D  c3Dÿ L for some c1; c2;
c3 P 0; and X 6 0g. This D generates, through (9), the set of probability
measures M that was defined in Example 2, and, through (7), the upper and
lower probabilities in Example 2.
For finitely generated models, it is often convenient to calculate inferences
directly from D0, rather than to first calculate the extreme points of M. For
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example, upper and lower previsions, defined by (7), can be computed directly
from D0 by using linear programming techniques. Also the generalized Bayes
rule can be applied directly to D0. Suppose that we obtain a statistical obser-
vation which generates a likelihood function L on X, and Lx > 0 for all
x 2 X. Then we simply update D0 to the finite set D00  fX=L : X 2 D0g. 7
Inferences can be calculated directly from D00 because the updated uncertainty
model D0  fX 2L : LX 2 Dg is the natural extension of D00.
Example 10 (Football). In the football example, suppose that we observe a
crowd of unhappy spectators leaving the game. If we interpret this as evidence
that the home team did not win, and model it through likelihoods 1
2
; 1; 1 for
W ;D; L, then we would simply update the initial set of judgements
D0  fD Lÿ W ; W ÿ D; Dÿ Lg to the set
D00  fX=L : X 2 D0g  fD Lÿ 2W ; 2W ÿ D; Dÿ Lg:
We can obtain a new model D0, and any inferences that are required, directly
from D00.
Another argument in favour of partial preference orderings is that they are
needed in a general theory of decision which allows imprecision in both
probabilities and utilities, as in [13,24,29]. In a general theory of decision, the
primary mathematical model should be some kind of partial preference or-
dering, of either the possible actions or more general objects such as ran-
domized actions, Savage acts or horse lotteries. Such orderings might be
constructed from separate assessments of imprecise probabilities and imprecise
utilities, but it is important to recognize that not all the reasonable partial
preference orderings can be constructed in this way. 8 That is illustrated by the
following example.
Example 11 (Intersection of complete preference orderings [29]). Consider the
simplest possible non-trivial decision problem, where there are two possible
states of the world, labelled as x and x0, and two possible consequences, c1 and
c2. Denote the four possible acts by aij, where aijx  ci and aijx0  cj for
i; j  1; 2. Suppose that a subject evaluates the acts by assessing both a prob-
ability P x, which satisfies 1
2
< P x < 1, and utility values Uc1 > Uc2. By
ordering acts according to their expected utility, he obtains the complete
preference ordering
a11  a12  a21  a22: 11
7 Updating is more complicated if Lx  0 for some x.
8 See [24,29] for a similar conclusion.
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A second subject assesses Px such that 0 < P x < 1
2
and Uc1 < Uc2,
and he obtains the complete preference ordering
a22  a12  a21  a11: 12
The intersection of these two complete orderings is the partial ordering in
which a12  a21 but all other pairs of acts are incomparable. This partial
ordering models the ‘consensus preferences’ that the two rational subjects
have in common. It would also be the appropriate model for an individual
who produced the complete orderings (11) and (12) by analysing the decision
problem in two dierent ways, but who was undecided about which analysis
to accept; such a person may have determined only that a12  a21. The partial
ordering is therefore a reasonable model for both individual and group
preferences.
But this partial ordering cannot be obtained from a set of probability
measures M and a set of utility functions U, by taking a  b if and only if a
has greater expected utility than b under all combinations of a probability
measure in M with a utility function in U. To prove that, suppose that a
partial ordering is obtained in this way. Then the comparison a12  a21 implies
that
1ÿ 2P xUc2 ÿ Uc1 > 0 for all P 2M and all U 2 U:
This implies that either P x > 1
2
and Uc1 > Uc2 for all P 2M and U 2 U,
giving the complete ordering 9
a11  a12  a21  a22; 13
or P x < 1
2
and Uc1 < Uc2 for all P 2M and U 2 U, giving the complete
ordering
a22  a12  a21  a11: 14
This shows that the partial ordering in which the only comparison is a12  a21
cannot be obtained from separate assessments of M and U.
Compare this example with the result of Savage [23], that every reasonable
complete preference ordering of acts can be obtained from separate assess-
ments of a precise probability measure and a precise utility function. Partial
preference orderings are more general than combinations of imprecise proba-
bility and imprecise utility. This is important because it shows that a general
theory of decision cannot be reduced to a theory of imprecise probability plus a
theory of imprecise utility. It also shows that preferences need to be con-
9 The complete orderings (13) and (14) are almost the same as (11) and (12), respectively, and
they would be identical if we ruled out the degenerate cases P x  0 and P x  1.
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structed in other ways, not only by assessing imprecise probabilities and im-
precise utilities. A very general method of constructing a coherent partial
preference ordering from simple judgements was outlined in [29].
7. Conclusions
Until now, most studies of imprecise probability have been concerned with
special types of upper and lower probability or with comparative probability
orderings. I have argued that these models are not suciently general to rep-
resent some common types of uncertainty. They are unable to retain infor-
mation about conditional probabilities and expectations that is needed for
making inferences and decisions.
In advocating more general models, I am not suggesting that we should stop
studying upper and lower probabilities, Choquet capacities, belief functions,
possibility measures and other special kinds of model. As I said in the intro-
duction, each of these models is useful in some special kinds of application, and
each has special mathematical properties that make it interesting from a the-
oretical point of view. However, I suggest that much more eort should be
devoted to studying the more general models which are needed in many
applications.
In this paper, I have discussed three more general models: coherent lower
previsions, sets of probability measures, and sets of desirable gambles (which
are essentially equivalent to partial preference orderings). I think that, in a
general theory of imprecise probability, all three of these models are needed. It
is not necessary for a unified theory to be presented in terms of a single type of
mathematical model. Standard probability theory makes use of several models,
including probability measures, probability density functions, cumulative dis-
tribution functions, expectation functionals and moment generating functions.
Probability theory also has special types of probability models, such as the
exponential family of distributions, which receive special attention, in the same
way that belief functions and possibility measures are important special types
of imprecise probability.
Coherent lower and upper previsions are needed in a general theory because
they are direct generalizations of the most commonly used models (coherent
lower and upper probabilities, order-2 capacities, belief functions, possibility
measures, linear previsions and probability measures), so that a theory of
imprecise probability can be applied directly to these special models. Lower
previsions are much more general and informative than lower probabilities,
and they seem to be adequate models in the great majority of applications that
are concerned with uncertainty but not with utility, and those applications in
which utilities are precisely known. They also have an advantage of familiarity
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over the more general models: they are closer to well-established concepts of
probability and expectation, and especially to de Finetti’s concept of prevision.
Sets of probability measures are also needed in a general theory because, at
present, most examples of coherent models are presented in this form. Since
upper and lower envelopes of a set of probability measures are always coherent
upper and lower previsions, specifying a set of probability measures is a simple
way of constructing a coherent model. To Bayesians and others who are fa-
miliar with standard probability theory, sets of probability measures are easier
to understand than the other models, because one can often interpret the
probability measures in a set as hypotheses about the ‘correct’ probability
measure and apply standard probability theory to each one. In this way, the
theory of sets of probability measures involves little more than standard
probability theory. For example, after receiving new information, a set can be
updated by using Bayes’ rule to update each probability measure in the set.
This is the approach adopted in the robust Bayesian theory [1], which uses a set
of probability measures as the canonical model for uncertainty.
But the robust Bayesian approach has some serious defects, and sets of
probability measures are not an adequate foundation for a general theory of
imprecise probability. There are many applications in which it is mistaken and
misleading to regard a set of probability measures as a set of hypotheses about
the ‘correct’ probabilities, because it is meaningless to talk of ‘correct’ prob-
abilities [30, Sections 2.10, 5.9]. That is the case in many applications of belief
functions and possibility measures [25,31,34,44]. In most of these applications,
too, belief functions and possibility measures are mathematically simpler than
the corresponding set of probability measures. Another disadvantage of sets of
probability measures is that they are not as closely related as the other models
to decision making and observable behaviour. To understand the practical
implications of a set of probability measures, it is often necessary to calculate
upper and lower probabilities, previsions or preferences. 10
There is an important duality relationship between coherent lower previ-
sions and sets of probability measures. Some aspects of the mathematical
theory can be handled more conveniently with one model and some with the
other. It is therefore important to be able to use both models and to exploit the
duality. Many authors, particularly robust Bayesians, have not yet recognized
that many of the things they are doing with sets of probability measures can be
done more easily with lower previsions. For example, simpler methods can be
found for checking coherence and making inferences from either precise or
imprecise probability assessments [35]. As another example, the main result of
10 A further limitation is that, with sets of probability measures, one cannot distinguish models
that are coherent from those that satisfy weaker consistency conditions such as ‘avoiding sure loss’
or ‘n-coherence’ [30].
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[37] was proved much more simply in [28] using only elementary properties of
coherent lower previsions; see also [33, Section 4]. Sets of probability measures
are mathematically convenient for some purposes, but they produce unneces-
sary complications in other cases.
Sets of desirable gambles and partial preference orderings are the most in-
formative of the mathematical models I have discussed, and they seem to be
able to model all the common types of uncertainty. They uniquely determine
upper and lower previsions and conditional previsions, and they contain all the
information about preferences that is relevant in making decisions. In many
ways they are the simplest and most natural mathematical models. The co-
herence axioms and rules of inference (natural extension) for sets of desirable
gambles are especially simple. In this paper, I have advocated these models on
the grounds of mathematical generality, but it is also arguable that they are the
simplest and most natural models from the point of view of interpretation.
Partial preference orderings are direct generalizations of partial comparative
probability orderings, and they are essential in a general theory of decision.
The main diculty with these models is that, because they can be more in-
formative than coherent lower previsions and sets of probability measures, they
can also be more complex and dicult to specify. Further research is needed to
develop special types of sets of desirable gambles that can be easily specified,
such as the finitely generated models.
Coherent lower previsions, sets of probability measures and sets of desirable
gambles are each useful for dierent purposes. I conclude that a unified theory
of imprecise probability will need to make use of all three models and to exploit
the duality relationships between them. In a general theory, it may be appro-
priate to adopt the most general of these models, sets of desirable gambles or
partial preference orderings, as the fundamental model.
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